Ron Patchett
Flying F-105s Over Hanoi
My wartime experiences were centered upon the conflict in South East Asia in the years of 1967-68. In early 1967 I was flying F-102s in Alaska and as pilots rotated out they were sent to SEA in varying capacities. As a relatively junior Capt I gladly jumped at a chance to fly F-105's rather than being stuck in the back seat of an F-4, or worse yet, sent to a Headquarters.
After 6 months RTU at McConnell AFB, Kansas I was assigned to the 355th Wing at Takhli, Thailand and became a member of the 333rd TFS. By agreement between the US and Thai governments, the F-105s stationed in Thailand (Takhli and Korat) were not allowed to expend ordinance in SVN of course we didn't expend ordinance in Laos or Cambodia either. Be that as it may when more air resources were required, the rules went out the window.
During my 7 months at Takhli I flew 104 combat missions (100 missions in North Vietnam). Most of these 100 were to Route Pack VI (downtown Hanoi and it's environs). The odd 4 combat missions were in SVN in support of the Marines and Army Special Forces at Khe Sanh during the siege.
Although there was probably nothing routine about going downtown, here is what one could expect on a typical Route Pack VI mission out of Takhli:
An F-105 Mission to Hanoi
An early morning Force mission to the Hanoi area was not a spur of the moment tasking. The Frag order from 7th AF Hqs. containing the targets, primary and secondary, and the tasked units would arrive late in the afternoon the day before the mission. The Wing Force Commander would be chosen, and he would complete the overall mission planning of routes, times, weapon loads, etc. Those assigned to fly the mission would have an early supper and try to get to bed early and get some rest.
Alarm clocks would go off around 0200 in order to gather at Wing Hqs about 0215 for the Force Commander's briefing. In attendance would be all the F-105 strike pilots, the F-105 Weasel pilots (SAM suppression) and representatives from the B-66s (standoff jammers), the KC-135 Tankers, Wing Intel and Wing Weather. During the briefing the Execute or Cancel order would come in from 7th AF.
The briefing would breakup about 0300 with the members going to their respective squadron areas for the detailed flight briefings. Those who felt like eating would do so at about 0400. The B-66s and KC-135s would commence their takeoffs at about this time. F-105 pilots would suit-up at about 0430, proceed to the aircraft for preflight, startup and takeoff in flights of four from about 0500 to 0530.
There would be six flights of four F-105 aircraft (two flights of Weasels and four flights of strike aircraft) converging on six tankers. There would also be four flights of F-4 MiGCAP (MiG suppression) from Ubon or Udorn on other tankers. When we joined up with our tanker, each of the four aircraft in the flight would cycle through very briefly and take on a small amount of fuel to ensure the refueling system was operating properly. Then the Flight would fly formation with the tanker as it flew the assigned racetrack pattern the Force Commander in the lead flight on the first tanker and the other five in-trail.
When the Flight Lead determined it was the appropriate time the Flight would cycle through and take on a full load of fuel. It would probably take less than five minutes on the boom, but it could seem like forever if it was rough; the tanker was flying in and out of weather; or, because of weather, the high-altitude tanker was unable to maintain a high airspeed. An F-105 Thud with full bomb load had considerable difficulty refueling at lower airspeeds. There were times during the monsoons when we had to refuel on high-altitude, slow-flying tankers when we had such a high angle of attack that we actually had to utilize minimum afterburner just to hang onto the boom. Just prior to drop-off the flight would cycle through for the third time for a quick top off so all aircraft would have approximately the same amount of fuel and be as close to full as possible.
If everything worked as planned, the drop-off would take place on time and at the Northern end of the tanker track up over Central Laos. From there we would head for Lima Site 85, the clandestine TACAN built on a high karst in Northern Laos just outside NVN. Here we would update our Inertial Nav Systems, join up with two flights of our MiG CAP (they would fly high cover over the Force while the other two flights were roamers positioning themselves between any threat and the Force) and send the two flights of Weasels out in front of the Force to search out the SAMs as they became a threat to the Force.
We would normally continue our NVN ingress considerably to the west to stay over the mountains as long as possible. We would be flying at 550 kts and between 12,000 and 17,000 ft. As we crossed the Black River and Red River valleys we would swing around from the Northwest and down a mountain ridge, which became known to US forces as Thud Ridge. This ridge, which pointed like an arrow at Hanoi, was steep enough that the North Vietnamese couldn't locate SAMs or guns there and provided some protection until we broke out over the Red River valley about 50 nm NW of Hanoi. (Of interest, and great frustration to US pilots, was the fact that the main NVN MiG base sat just at the end of Thud Ridge, and we would frequently see MiGs taking off to position themselves to attempt an attack during our egress, but our Rules of Engagement said we couldn't attack the base or the MiGs until they became a threat. Late in 1967 the RoE changed, and we did hit the base a number of times.)
As we broke out over the river valley the SAMs and guns would become very active. The SAM site radars were attacked by the Weasels, and any actual SAM launches were called out to the Force. If a SAM launch could be acquired visually, evasion was usually not extremely difficult. It was those launched from behind or up through a mid-level cloud deck that caused the majority of the SAM losses. Of the guns, only the 85mm and 100mm were effective at our ingress altitudes. Their gun laying radars were also attacked by the Weasels, so they usually put up barrage-type patterns that we could evade until we got to the target area and needed to stabilize as we set up for the roll-in.
At the target the Force Commander would set up the first flight to initiate the roll-in. The aircraft in the first flight would normally each carry six CBUs (Cluster Bomb Units) that were used for flak suppression. Each aircraft would be assigned one quadrant around the target. As you rolled in at a 45 degree dive angle there was no doubt in your mind where the guns were firing from, and they became the aim point for your quadrant. Each CBU had hundreds of bomblets--some timed for air burst; some, for ground burst; and some, delayed--all intended to cause havoc amongst the gunners and prevent their concentration on the strike aircraft to follow.
The strike aircraft would follow the Force Commander and roll-in by flight. The strike aircraft weapons would depend on the target. If it was an area target like a rail yard they would each carry six 750 lb bombs; if it was a hardened target like a bridge they would each carry two 3000 lb bombs. Like the Force Commander they would dive at a 45-degree angle and 550 kts. At 8000 ft with the piper at the proper aimpoint, offset for predicted wind, they would release their bombs and start their pull out. They would pull at least 4 Gs in order to have completed pull out by 4000 ft, the altitude at which the smaller caliber guns with their high rates of fire became effective. As soon as the nose came above the horizon it would be light the burner and haul a** out of the target area and back to Thud Ridge, usually supersonic.
Once back over Thud Ridge the flights would rejoin, check one another over for battle damage and head back toward the tankers. It was vital during this phase of the mission to not relax too much for at this time the MiG CAP could not cover the spread out flights and there was always the threat of being bounced by MiGs.
Back at the tankers, it was a small drink for just enough fuel to get home. Recovery at our home base, Takhli, usually required a total mission time of 4 to 5 hours; though one time we had a pilot down on Thud Ridge and flew support for the rescue forces requiring a mission time of over 8 hours. I lost track of how many times I refueled on that mission.
After shut down, the first stop would be a maintenance debrief followed by an Intel debrief. We were usually done by 1100, would go get a bite to eat, get a short nap, and then start to get ready for the next day if we were on the schedule.
I am particularly proud of the fact that during the latter portion of my tour I was one of a very small number of Captains selected to be a Force Commander, combat lead for the entire wing mission of 24 aircraft going to Route Pack VI.
Tale of a Nighttime Lover:
One night about 0130 all the pilots not on the early morning schedule were pulled out of bed and sent to Sq Ops. They were looking for eight pilots that had not spent more than about an hour in the Stag Bar that night. The old Doolie philosophy, not having to answer any question not directed specifically at you, didn't register after being so rudely roused, and I volunteered; I had only had one beer. I was immediately Flight Lead of the first flight--Get out to the aircraft, get airborne and you'll be briefed on the radio by ABCCC (Airborne Command & Control Center).
What do you mean get airborne; don't you realize it's dark out there I'm an F-105 pilot, a daytime fighter and a nighttime lover!!!? My protestations got me nowhere, and I was airborne by about 0215. Now you've got to understand, the extent of my nighttime flying in the previous 4 months had been all of about 30 minutes for each early mission takeoff and flight toward the tanker. By the time we got to the tanker it was always getting light. It was not to be so this night! ABCCC told us we would hit a tanker and then be directed to a Sky Spot (radar directed weapons release) at an undisclosed location.
There were times during the day under certain visibility conditions that it was hard to pick up the tanker. This night over eastern Laos, with no moon, a high thin overcast and no ground lights, there was no problem picking up the tanker; it was lite up like a Christmas tree. I had had one night refueling during F-105 upgrade, and that had been at least 6 months before; I was not looking forward to this. The Boomer cleared me in to the contact position; a little rough on the stick and throttle, but not bad--Contact, taking on fuel. About that time the KC-135 reached the northern end of it's race track and started a left hand turn; still not bad; I was hanging in there. Then for some unexplained reason the damn KC pilot rolled inverted!! A very quick glance down at my instruments confirmed I had a severe case of vertigo. I told the Boomer not to let go of me until we were straight and level. After what seemed like an hour, the KC pilot finally called straight and level. I snuck a few glances at my instruments, and the world turned right side up again. It doesn't sound like much when you are reading it, but let me tell you, living it was one of the more memorable events in my life. The rest of the mission was anti-climactic, except for the fact that our Inertial Navigation System said we were over northern South Vietnam.
Thirty years later, I was talking to the Dock Master at the marina where I kept my boat and learned he was a Special Forces grunt that had been at a hilltop artillery support fire base just outside the Khe Sanh perimeter during the siege. I told him the story of the Sky Spot to the area, and he said they received numerous unseen nighttime fighter air support deliveries that hit the NVN just outside their perimeter and held them at bay until the daylight when they could get direct support aircraft in. Could it be.?
A Meeting of Friends
After finishing my 100 missions over NVN in 1968, I didn't get to go home as was usually the case. Instead, because I was an experienced Force Commander, I was sent to 7th AF Hqs as an Out-Country Staff Officer. One of my tasks was the Hqs liaison for the introduction into Vietnam of Paveway, one of the earliest laser guided munitions. While there we planned a Special Mission, and I was sent to Thailand to brief the participating units on their roles in that operation.
While at Nakhon Phanom I met up with classmate Ed Leonard. We had a great chat at the O'Club, especially about his job of flying the venerable A-1 Skyraider. He related how much he enjoyed the Firefly mission, A-1 attack along the Ho Chi Minh trail, but how vulnerable he felt during the Sandy (Search and Rescue) missions. We parted, agreeing to see one another again soon.
Shortly after returning to 7th Hqs in May '68 I heard of a Navy A-7 pilot having been shot down in the Tchepone area. The Hqs followed the Rescue Operation closely during the three days and two nights before the Navy pilot was successfully picked up. The cost was large, however: six US aircraft were lost during the rescue operation. I was greatly saddened to hear that Ed piloted Sandy 7, one of the six aircraft, and that he had not been recovered. It would be 5 long years before he was released by the North Vietnamese.
For actions during my duties at Takhli I was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross w/2olc and the Air Medal w/11olc. For my actions at the Hqs I received the Bronze Star.